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Abstract
Judgment aggregation models a group of agents having to collectively decide over a number of logically interconnected issues 
starting from their individual opinions. In recent years, a growing literature has focused on the design of logical systems for 
social choice theory, and for judgment aggregation in particular, making use of logical languages designed ad hoc for this 
purpose. In this paper we deploy the existing formalism of Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments (DL-PA), an instance 
of Propositional Dynamic Logic where atomic programs affect propositional valuations. We show that DL-PA is a well-suited 
formalism for modeling the aggregation of binary judgments from multiple agents, by providing logical equivalences in 
DL-PA for some of the best-known aggregation procedures, desirable axioms coming from the literature on judgment 
aggregation and properties for the safety of the agenda problem.
Keywords: dynamic logic, modal logic, social choice theory, computational social choice, automated reasoning,.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory gathers mathematical models for the study of collective decision-making, such 
as voting and elections, or the allocation of resources among a group of agents [2]. Judgment 
aggregation is one such model where the individual opinions expressed by the agents over a set 
of correlated issues are aggregated into a collective choice by means of an aggregation rule. 
The classical example that initiated this research field is known in the literature as the discursive 
dilemma [32]: three agents have to decide over three issues that are logically correlated, and though 
all agents express consistent views, issue-wise majority voting can lead to inconsistent outcomes 
(cf. Example 2.1). The study of the aggregation of binary judgments can be traced back to work by 
legal scholars [29] and is now an established framework in artificial intelligence to handle complex 
collective decisions [16, 25].
The evident link between judgment aggregation and (propositional) logic, together with the 
modularity of many judgment aggregation results looking for incompatible combinations of 
axiomatic properties, inspired researchers to investigate logical formalizations of this framework. 
Notable examples include the work of [38], who formulated judgment aggregation in a minimal©
logical language to refer to the outcomes of aggregation rules, and of [1], who designed a Judgment 
Aggregation Logic with a Hilbert-style axiomatization, later expanded by a natural deduction system 
proposed by [39]. Similar formalizations had already been proposed for social choice functions—the 
main model in social choice theory, where a set of individual preferences represented by linear orders 
over a set of alternatives has to be aggregated into a collective preference. To give some examples, 
Arrow’s theorem, the cornerstone result of social choice theory, has been expressed in higher-order 
logics [37, 47], first-order logic [24] and modal logic [8], while a modal logic for strategic preference 
aggregation was proposed by [45].
The final aim of formalizing aggregation models in a suitable logical language is the formal 
verification of properties and theoretical results already obtained in the literature and, ultimately, 
the automated discovery of new theorems. This can be viewed as a sort of ‘Hilbert program’ 
where concepts and results that were previously established in an informal language are recast in 
formal logic. This approach has recently been proven very successful in preference aggregation and 
voting, thanks to the combination of mathematical lemmas and automated reasoning techniques. 
In preference aggregation, the seminal work of [43] obtained a semi-automated proof of Arrow’s 
theorem by combining two inductive lemmas with SAT-solving. [22] later brought this approach 
to the level of theorem discovery in the field of ranking sets of objects, automatically testing all 
combinations of 20 axiomatic properties via SAT-solving, which combined with a general inductive 
lemma gave rise to 84 impossibility theorems (among which many non-trivial ones). In recent years, 
a number of open problems in classical social choice theory has then been tackled and solved [5–7] 
using a variety of techniques in automated reasoning from SAT-solvers, satisfiability modulo theory 
(SMT-solvers) and minimal unsatisfiable subset extraction.
Despite its success, the use of automated reasoning techniques in social choice theory often 
requires proving hard mathematical lemmas, thus confining its use to specialists. A more friendly 
and flexible tool is of need, with human-readable formulas that can be easier to understand and 
manipulate in search for new results and new applications. However, each high-level formalization 
of judgment aggregation that has been proposed is based on a new logical language, making the use 
of automated reasoning techniques less immediate. In this paper we aim at attaining both goals by 
employing a high-level logical language that is also amenable to automated reasoning through the 
use of a dedicated prover, or possibly through a translation into propositional logic.
For this reason, the logical formalism of our choice is Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assign-
ments (DL-PA) [3, 15], which is an instance of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [20, 41] where 
atomic programs assign truth values to propositional variables. An existing literature in the fields of 
knowledge representation and multi-agent systems has proven DL-PA to be a ‘unifying language’ 
to express a variety of frameworks, from belief change operations [26] and abstract argumentation 
[14], to interaction in normative systems [27] and social simulations [21]. The present paper aims 
to add another important setting from the area of computational social choice to the previous list 
of successful results: i.e. judgment aggregation. Crucially, DL-PA is grounded on propositional 
logic, meaning that there exists a translation for every DL-PA formula into a propositional one 
(cf. Section 2.4), easing the application of automated reasoning techniques.
In this paper we translate three classical computational problems in judgment aggregation as the 
verification of DL-PA specifications, showing the flexibility of the language in a variety of situations. 
We begin by translating a wide range of aggregation rules proposed in the literature on judgment 
aggregation as DL-PA programs, guaranteeing that the size of each program remains polynomial 
in the number of agents and issues. While this translation is straightforward for most well-known 
rules, we show that non-trivial rules based on minimization also correspond to a relatively simple 
DL-PA formula. Aggregation rules are usually justified in reason of the axiomatic properties they 
possess, and the properties themselves often serve to prove limitative results on the boundaries of
aggregation—the notorious impossibility theorems. We thus translate as DL-PA formulas the most 
common aggregation axioms and we interpret them on the DL-PA translation of rules previously 
obtained. Finally, we focus on the problem of ensuring a safe aggregation process, i.e. identifying 
constraints whereby aggregating individual judgments yields a consistent result, obtaining DL-PA 
formulas whose satisfaction corresponds to various levels of safety.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by providing the basic definitions of 
judgment aggregation and DL-PA, and we set the stage for a translation of the former into the latter. 
In Section 3 we propose DL-PA programs to compute judgment aggregation procedures. Section 4 
provides translations for the axiomatic properties of aggregation functions, and Section 5 focuses on 
formulas characterizing safe aggregation. In Section 6 we analyse and compare our results with the 
literature and consider the case for automated reasoning. Section 7 concludes and points to a number 
of directions for future work.
2 From judgment aggregation to DL-PA
In this section we introduce the notation and formal background of both judgment aggregation and 
star-free DL-PA. We present the translation of DL-PA into propositional logic, given its importance 
for using automated reasoning tools. Furthermore, we provide our first contribution by showing how 
to translate any instance of a judgment aggregation problem into DL-PA.
2.1 Binary aggregation with integrity constraints
In judgment aggregation agents give acceptance/rejection opinions over logically connected issues to 
get a collective choice. There are two main frameworks that can be considered: the classic formula-
based model [32], in which individuals vote directly on complex logical formulas, and binary 
aggregation with integrity constraints [13, 23] where agents have binary opinions on atomic issues 
linked by an integrity constraint. The two formalisms are equivalent, in the sense that we can translate 
a problem from one setting into the other and vice versa [19], and we choose the latter for ease of 
presentation.
Let I = {1, . . . , m} be a finite non-empty set of issues, on which the agents in the finite non-
empty set N = {1, . . . , n}, for odd n (as we shall see, this is just a technical assumption), express 
a binary opinion. Individual opinions form a boolean combinatorial domain D = {0, 1}m, where 
1 denotes acceptance and 0 rejection. A simple propositional language can be defined from the set 
of propositional symbols {p1, . . . , pm}, with one atom per issue in I. Then, integrity constraints 
are formulas of this language that we denote by IC. They express the logical inter-dependencies 
among the issues, where IC = ⊤ if there is none. Consider now the following classical example of 
aggregation, known in the literature as the discursive dilemma [31]:
EXAMPLE 2.1
Three judges have to decide whether (1) a defendant is liable for breaching a contract, depending on 
whether (2) the contract forbade a particular action and (3) the defendant did the action anyway. Let 
thus IC = p1 ↔ (p2 ∧ p3) be the constraint expressing the aforementioned law on contracts, and 
consider the profile below:
1 2 3
Judge 1 1 1 1
Judge 2 0 0 1
Judge 3 0 1 0
Majority 0 1 1
∗
j
Observe that while each of the judges respects the constraint, the majority outcome does not.
A ballot B = (b1 . . . bm) ∈ D is a particular choice of zeroes and ones for the issues. For example, 
the second judge’s ballot in Example 2.1 is (001). We interchangeably see a ballot B as an assignment 
of truth values to the propositional variables in {p1, . . . , pm}. The Hamming distance measures in 
our setting how much two ballots disagree on the issues, and is defined as H(B, B∗) := |{j ∈ I | bj 
6= b }|. For example, if B1 = (111) and B2 = (001), we have H(B1, B2) = 2, since they differ on 
the first two issues.
The set of all ballots satisfying IC, written Mod(IC) = {B | B |H IC}, is called the models of 
IC. For instance, Mod(IC) = {(111), (001), (010)} for the IC presented in Example 2.1. We denote 
by Bi the individual ballot of agent i and we assume all agents to be rational, i.e. Bi ∈ Mod(IC) 
for all i ∈ N . A profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) collects all the individual ballots of the agents, such that 
bij indicates the j-th element of ballot Bi in B. The set Nj
B
:1 = {i ∈ N | bij = 1} is the coalition 
of supporters of issue j in B. An aggregation procedure, which we also call aggregation rule or 
aggregator, is a function F mapping a rational profile to a (possibly irrational) non-empty set of 
ballots. The following is the formal definition:
DEFINITION 2.2
Given a set of agents N , a set of issues I and an integrity constraint IC, an aggregation procedure is 
a function F : Mod(IC)N → (2D \ ∅), for 2D the powerset of D.
A rule is called resolute if its outcome is a singleton for every profile, and irresolute otherwise. 
We denote by F(B)j the outcome of a resolute aggregation rule on issue j. An example of aggregator 
is the majority rule used in Example 2.1.
2.2 Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments
DL-PA has both formulas and programs, and atomic programs modify the truth values of proposi-
tional variables. Our choice of logical language to describe problems in judgment aggregation is that 
of star-free DL-PA, meaning that we do not make use of unbounded iteration.1
The language of star-free DL-PA is thus given by the following Backus–Naur grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈π〉ϕ
π ::= +p | −p | π ;π | π ∪ π | ϕ?
where p ranges over P = {p, q, . . . }, a countable set of propositional variables.
Atomic formulas consist of variables and constants ⊤ and ⊥. Complex formulas are built via
negation ¬, disjunction ∨ and a diamond modality for each program 〈π〉. Other boolean connectives
(e.g. conjunction ∧, implication→, biconditional↔, exclusive disjunction⊕) and the dual operator
[π ]ϕ are defined in the usual way. Atomic programs +p and−p assign value true or false to variable
p, respectively. Sequential composition π ;π ′ executes first π and then π ′, nondeterministic union
π ∪ π ′ nondeterministically chooses to execute either π or π ′ and test ϕ? checks that ϕ holds
(and fails otherwise).
1This logic is obtained from full DL-PA via elimination of the Kleene star, as shown by [3].
TABLE 1 Interpretation of DL-PA connectives and programs
‖p‖= {v ∈ V | p ∈ v}
‖⊤‖= 2P
‖⊥‖= ∅
‖¬ϕ ‖= 2P\ ‖ϕ ‖
‖ϕ ∨ ψ ‖= ‖ϕ ‖∪‖ψ ‖
‖〈π〉ϕ ‖= {v ∈ V | there is v1 s.t. (v, v1) ∈‖π ‖ and v1 ∈‖ϕ ‖}
‖+p‖ = {(v1, v2) | v2 = v1 ∪ {p}}
‖−p‖ = {(v1, v2) | v2 = v1 \ {p}}
‖π ;π ′ ‖ = ‖π ‖◦‖π ′ ‖
‖π ∪ π ′ ‖ = ‖π ‖∪‖π ′ ‖
‖ϕ?‖ = {(v, v) |v ∈‖ϕ ‖}
A valuation v is a subset of P that specifies the truth value of every propositional variable, so that
V = 2P = {v1, v2, . . . } is the set of all valuations. When p ∈ v, we say that p is true in v (and we
say that p is false in v otherwise). As illustrated in Table 1, DL-PA programs are interpreted through
a unique relation between valuations.2
As a notational convention, formulas will start by an uppercase letter, while programs and counters
will start by a lowercase letter. The standard programming language primitives can be expressed in
PDL, and we thus have skip := ⊤?, if ϕ thenπ1else π2 := (ϕ? ;π1) ∪ (¬ϕ? ;π2), p ←[ q :=
if q then + p else − p and if ϕ doπ := if ϕ thenπelse skip. We let the conjunction of an
empty set of formulas be ⊤, and the sequential and nondeterministic composition of an empty set of
programs be skip. Namely,
∧
ϕ∈∅ ϕ := ⊤, and
⋃
π∈∅ π := skip, and ;π∈∅ π := skip.
2.3 Basic DL-PA programs and formulas
In this section we present useful DL-PA programs and formulas, for the most part already introduced
by [3].
In DL-PA we can repeatedly execute a program n times or up to n times, as follows:
πn := π ;πn−1
π≤n := (skip ∪ π) ;π≤n−1
with the convention that both programs are equal to skip in case n = 0.
Any natural number s ∈ N0 can be written in DL-PA via its binary expression, thanks to a
conjunction of t = ⌊log s⌋ + 1 variables. If x is the binary expression of s, we use a conjunction
of literals qi and ¬qi, with i ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊log s⌋}, such that a non-negated variable means that the
corresponding binary digit in x is a 1, while a negated variable indicates a 0. For instance, if s = 14,
we have that x = 1110 and the corresponding formula in DL-PA is 14 := q3∧q2∧q1∧¬q0.
2We can construct a Kripke model MDL-PA for PDL by letting the valuations be the states, by including {+p | p ∈
P} ∪ {−p | p ∈ P} in the set of atomic programs, and by considering the identity function for the valuation [3].
The following two programs increment (up to 2t−1) and set to zero, i.e. assign truth value false to 
all the variables in P, a given t-bit counter:
incr(xt) := ¬

 ∧
0≤i≤t−1
qxi

? ; ⋃
0≤k≤t−1



¬qxk ∧ ∧
0≤i≤k−1
qxi

? ;+qxk ; ⋃
0≤i≤k−1
−qxi


zero(P) :=
⋃
p∈P
−p
where xt := {qxi | 0 ≤ i < t} is a set of variables. Observe that in program zero(P) the order in
which elements are set to false does not matter, as it leads to identical interpretations.
We can check whether two numbers are equal, whether one is greater than the other, or whether
one is greater than or equal to the other, via the following DL-PA formulas:
xt = yt :=
∧
0≤k<t
q xk ↔ q
y
k
xt> yt :=
∨
0≤ k<t
(( ∧
k<i<t
(
q xi ↔ q
y
i
))
∧ q xk ∧ ¬q
y
k
)
xt ≥ yt := xt > yt ∨ xt = yt
where the general idea is to compare the digits at the same position in the binary expressions of
the two numbers.3
We may need to reverse the truth value of some variables in a set P. The first program below flips
the truth value of a single nondeterministically chosen variable in P. The second nondeterministically
resets the truth value of all variables in P to some new value: as a result, either their truth value has
been flipped or not.
flip1(P) :=
⋃
p∈P
( p ←[ ¬p)
flip≥0(P) :=
p∈P
(+p ∪ −p)
Finally, the next two formulas hold when different types of minimization are achieved. The first is
true if and only if it is not possible to make ϕ true by flipping the truth values of the variables in a
strict subset of the non-empty set P. The second holds if and only if the Hamming distance to a state
where ϕ holds is at least s, where the variables outside P are kept constant.
D(ϕ,P) := ¬
〈⋃
p∈P
flip≥0(P \ {p})
〉
ϕ
H(ϕ,P,≥s) :=
{
⊤ if s = 0
¬
〈
flip1(P)≤s−1
〉
ϕ if s > 0
3In some cases we need to compare numbers that can be expressed with different minimal amounts of binary digits. In
programs where multiple counters are used, we take the maximal value taken by a counter as the upper bound for all other
counters in that program. Let t be the maximal number of variables needed to express the maximal value a counter can take
in a program: if another number is expressible by using only k < t variables, it will nonetheless be expressed by t variables
with ¬qi for all i such that k < i ≤ t. We then write x instead of x
t .
Observe that D(ϕ, P) does not imply that ϕ will hold if we flip the truth value of all the variables 
in P. In our setting this definition suffices, but such an alternative formulation has been given as well 
by [26].
2.4 From DL-PA to propositional logic
A translation from DL-PA formulas to propositional formulas was proposed by [3]. We here give it 
for the star-free fragment of DL-PA. It is presented in terms of reduction axioms: equivalences that, 
first, simplify programs into atomic programs, second, ‘push’ atomic programs across the boolean 
connectives inside formulas until they meet an atomic formula and, third, eliminate atomic programs.
[ϕ?]ψ ↔ ϕ → ψ
[π1 ;π2]ϕ ↔ [π1][π2]ϕ
[π1 ∪ π2]ϕ ↔ [π1]ϕ ∧ [π2]ϕ
[π ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[π ]ϕ
[π ](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)↔ [π]ϕ1 ∧ [π ]ϕ2
[+p]q ↔
{
⊤ if p = q
q otherwise
[−p]q ↔
{
⊥ if p = q
q otherwise
For example, the DL-PA formula [(+p∪−q) ;( p∧ r?)]r∨ q is reduced to the propositional formula
(r → (r ∨ q))∧ (( p∧ r)→ r). Note that when translating formulas such as flip≥0(P) we are going
to visit all valuations with all possible combinations for the values of the variables in P, which gives
an exponential explosion in the length of the translation.
2.5 Aggregation problems translated into DL-PA
We here show how to translate profiles and aggregation rules from judgment aggregation into
DL-PA. The former are turned into a valuation, while the latter become programs. As a first step,
let B := {pij | i, j ∈ N} be the subset of P whose variables encode the opinion of agent i on issue
j. Analogously, O := {pj | j ∈ N} is the subset of P whose variables refer to the possible output for
any issue j.
From these two infinite sets, we derive two finite subsets for specific n agents and m issues.
Namely, for N = {1, . . . , n} and I = {1, . . . ,m}, we let Bn,m := {pij | i ∈ N and j ∈ I} be
the set of propositional variables referring to the decision of the agents in N on the issues in I , and
we let the variables in Om := {pj | j ∈ I} refer to the collective decision on the issues in I. Finally,
we define an additional set U := {qi | i ∈ N} of variables of P that are used to encode finitely many
counters in our programs. We suppose B, O and U to be disjoint.
The following definition identifies the valuations that correspond to a profile in judgment
aggregation.
DEFINITION 2.3
Valuation vB translates profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) on m issues, in case
(i) vB ⊆ Bn,m, and
(ii) pij ∈ vB if and only if bij = 1.
The first condition ensures that only variables corresponding to the decision of the agents on the
issues could possibly be true in vB. This means, in particular, that counters are initially set to zero.
According to the second condition, a variable in vB is true if and only if the corresponding entry
in profile B has value 1. For example, if we have profile B = ((01), (00), (10)) for 3 agents and
2 issues, the set B3,2 = {p11, p12, p21, p22, p31, p32} corresponds to the entries in the profile, the set
O
2 = {p1, p2} handles the outcome of aggregation rules and valuation vB = {p12, p31} ⊆ B3,2
encodes the profile.
Let V fvB = {v
′ ∩Om | (vB, v ′) ∈‖ f(Bn,m)‖} be the set of valuations v′ restricted to Om reachable
from vB through f(Bn,m). We now translate aggregation rules into DL-PA programs.
DEFINITION 2.4
Program f(Bn,m) translates aggregation rule F, if for all profiles B and valuations vB translating B
according to Definition 2.3, it is the case that V fvB = F(B).
In Definition 2.4 we thus compare the truth values of the outcome variables inOm in the valuations
reachable after the execution of program f(Bn,m) with the outcome ballots of rule F (recall that we
interchangeably see a ballot as a valuation over {p1, . . . , pm}). If the program translates the rule we
should get the same set on both sides— a singleton for resolute rules. This definition will be used in
the proofs of Section 3 to ensure that our translations are correct.
Before proceeding, we stress an important point. Since aggregation rules are defined over a
specific number of issues, number of agents and integrity constraint, the programs we provide as
their DL-PA translation are to be intended as general ‘program schemas’: a set of issues I, set of
agents N and constraint IC need to be provided to completely spell them out.
The integrity constraint is written as a formula IC over variables in Om. To check whether a
particular choice of truth values over Bn,m corresponds to a profile, i.e. all the individual ballots
satisfy the constraint, the following formula must hold:
RationalIC(B
n,m) :=
∧
i∈N
〈⋃
j∈I
pj ← [ pij
〉
IC.
That is, we check whether by copying into the outcome variables the truth values of the variables for
each individual ballot, the formula for the integrity constraint is true.
The next formula is true if and only if we are in a valuation that possibly corresponds to the
encoding of a profile, meaning that the initial conditions of Definition 2.3 hold:
ProfIC(B
n,m,Om) :=

 ∧
pj∈Om
¬pj

 ∧ RationalIC(Bn,m).
Program profIC(B
n,m,Om) := ProfIC(Bn,m,Om)? tests that the properties of a profile hold at the
current valuation. Observe that in the codomain of ‖ profIC(B
n,m,Om) ‖ the outcome variables are
false, but this is not enough to conclude that condition (i) of Definition 2.3 holds. Nevertheless, all
programs translating aggregation rules will only need to inspect variables in Bn,m and (possibly)
change the truth values of variables in Om, and they will set to zero all counters as the first step.
Hence, the valuation reached after the execution of profIC(B
n,m, Om) will be considered as encoding 
a profile as well.
With a slight abuse of notation, in the rest of this paper we drop the superscripts from Bn,m and 
O
m to simplify the reading of the programs. It will be clear from context when we are referring to 
the infinite sets B and O instead.
3 Aggregation rules
Aggregation rules are the basic bricks of judgment aggregation, since they provide different ways to 
produce collective choices from the individual judgments of the agents on the issues. In this section 
we translate as DL-PA programs some of the most studied examples of aggregation procedures. We 
prove the correctness of our translation for a resolute and an irresolute rule, omitting the proofs 
whenever they can be obtained as a straightforward adaptation of the presented ones.
3.1 Expressibility of aggregation rules
The aptness of DL-PA to model judgment aggregation can be assessed by its capability to express 
judgment aggregation procedures. Our first general result is thus a positive one: we prove below that 
any aggregation rule, as introduced in Definition 2.2, can be expressed as a DL-PA program.
THEOREM 3.1
For every N , I and IC, all aggregation rules F : Mod(IC)N → 2D \ ∅ are expressible as DL-PA 
programs.
PROOF. We start by examining the case of a resolute aggregator F. Consider the DL-PA program 
consisting of a sequential composition of sub-programs of the form if ϕB do πF(B) for each
profile B, for ϕB := (
∧
j∈I
∧
i∈NBj:1
pij) ∧ (
∧
j∈I
∧
i∈(N \NBj:1)
¬pij) and πF(B) := {j∈I|F(B)j=1} +
pj ; {j∈I|F(B)j=0} − pj. Namely, ϕB completely identifies profile B and πF(B) modifies the outcome
variables according to the result of F on profile B.
If F is irresolute it is sufficient to consider a sequential composition of sub-programs of the form
if ϕB do
⋃
B∈F(B) πB, where πB is defined as πB := {j∈I|bj=1} + pj ; {j∈I|bj=0} − pj, generating a
non-deterministic program whose output consists of all outcomes of F. These two types of programs
provide a straightforward translation of resolute and irresolute rules. ¤
Theorem 3.1 shows that DL-PA is fully expressive when it comes to translating judgment
aggregation rules. Nevertheless, observe that the formulas used in the proof are all of size
exponential in the number of individuals and issues. More precisely, since all profiles explicitly occur
in the specification of the programs, the size is in the order of 2|I|·|N |. Therefore, in the remainder
of this section we present compact programs for a selection of well-known rules proposed in the
literature on judgment aggregation (cf. Appendix A for an example illustrating the compactness of
our translations). The ideas appearing in the construction of these programs suggest how to translate
other rules that are not explicitly presented here.
3.2 Simple aggregation rules
We begin our study of compact representations of judgment aggregation rules with a section on what
we call simple rules. By this term we mean resolute rules relatively easy to explain and understand,
which regularly occur in real-world scenarios.
∣ ∣
3.2.1 Dictatorship of Agent i While in general the dictatorial rule is an unattractive procedure to 
use, it gives us perhaps the simplest example of aggregator. The outcome of the dictatorship of some 
fixed agent i ∈ N for all profiles B is her individual ballot. Namely, for all j ∈ I Dictatorshipi(B)j = 
1 if and only if bij = 1. In the following proposition we find the translation of Dictatorshipi as a 
DL-PA program. The given proof serves as an example for all propositions on resolute rules.
PROPOSITION 3.2
Let I and N be given, and let dictatorshipi(B) := ;j∈I ( p j ←[ pij). Then, program dictatorshipi 
translates rule Dictatorshipi.
PROOF. To shorten notation, we call F the aggregation rule Dictatorshipi, and f the program
dictatorshipi. By Definition 2.4 we need to show that for all profiles B, if vB is the valuation 
translating B (cf. Definition 2.3), and (vB, v ′) ∈ ‖ f(B) ‖, then for all j ∈ I we have F(B)j = 
1 if and only if pj ∈ v ′.
For the left-to-right direction, consider an arbitrary j ∈ I such that F(B)j = 1: we have to show 
that pj ∈ v ′. From the definition of F, we have that F(B)j = 1 if and only if bij = 1, where 
agent i is the dictator. Let vB be the valuation translating B. By construction, we have that pij ∈ vB 
and pj 6∈ vB.
Let v ′ be the outcome valuation, i.e. such that (vB, v ′) ∈ ‖ f(B)‖. There is exactly one such 
valuation. By the definition of F and by applying program equivalences, we get that there are 
valuations v1, . . . , vm+1 such that v1 = vB, vm+1 = v ′, and
(v1, v2) ∈ ‖( pi1? ; +p1) ∪ (¬pi1? ; −p1)‖, . . . , (vm, vm+1) ∈ ‖( pim? ; +pm) ∪ (¬pim? ; −pm)‖ .
Let a ∈ {1, . . . , m} and b be two indices such that b = a + 1 and (va, vb) ∈ ‖ ( p ij? ; +pj) ∪ 
(¬pij? ; −pj) ‖ for the arbitrary issue j ∈ I we are considering. Let us call A = {(v, v∗) | pij ∈ 
v and v∗ = v ∪ {p j}} and B = {(v, v∗) | ¬pij ∈ v and v∗ = v \ {p j}}. By the interpretation of DL-PA 
programs given in Table 1 we get that (va, vb) ∈ A ∪ B. We thus have to check whether (va, vb) ∈ A 
or (va, vb) ∈ B, since A and B are disjoint sets. In order to do so, we have to inspect whether pij ∈ va 
or ¬pij ∈ va.
We now show that pij ∈ va, which will allow us to conclude that pj ∈ v ′. In case a = 1, we have 
that va = vB and thus pij ∈ vB by assumption. Otherwise, note that v1, . . . , va only (possibly) differ 
in the truth value assigned to p1, . . . , pj−1, respectively. Thus, since pij ∈ vB = v1 and the truth 
value of pij has not been modified in v2, . . . , va−1, we have that pij ∈ va. Hence, (va, vb) ∈ A, and 
vb = va ∪ {p j}. Observe also that vb+1, . . . , vm+1 only (possibly) differ in the truth values assigned 
to pj+1, . . . , pm. Therefore, we can conclude that pj ∈ vm+1 = v ′.
For the right-to-left direction, we can equivalently show that if F(B)j = 0 then pj 6∈ v ′. The 
proof is analogous to the one presented above, with the sole exception that we have to show that 
(va, vb) ∈ B in order to conclude that pj 6∈ v ′. ¤
The length of the program dictatorshipi increases only if the number of issues does, as it 
considers just the truth values of the dictator’s variables while ignoring the rest.
3.2.2 Quota rules A quota rule specifies for each issue a certain threshold of support that has to 
be reached in order for the issue to be accepted in the outcome [11]. The quota q can be any integer 
such that 1 ≤ q ≤ |N |. In case all issues have the same quota, we speak of uniform quota rules. If qj 
is the quota for issue j ∈ I and Eq = (q1, . . . , qm), we have
QuotaqE(B)j = 1 if and only if ∣NjB:1∣ ≥ qj.
We now state a result that provides, for every choice of quotas, a DL-PA program translating the 
corresponding quota rule.
PROPOSITION 3.3
Let I be a set of issues, N a set of agents, and 1 ≤ q1, . . . , qm ≤ |N |. Let supp := {q1, . . . , qlog n}
and quotaj := {q
′
1, . . . , q
′
log n} for j ∈ I be disjoint subsets of U. The QuotaqE rule is translated into 
the following DL-PA program:
quotaEq(B) := ;
j∈I
zero(quotaj) ; ;
j∈I
incr(quotaj)
qj ; ;
j∈I
(
zero(supp) ;
( ;
i∈N
if pij do incr(supp)) ; if supp ≥ quotaj do + pj
)
.
The subprogram incr(quotaj)
qj sets the counter variables in the set quotaj to the value qj and the
counter variables in supp keep track of the support for the issue currently inspected.
A special instance of quota rules is the majority rule, an intuitive aggregator recurring in many
everyday examples, where for all issues the quota is fixed at n+12 . Recall that we assumed the number
of agents to be odd, a common assumption that permits to leave aside the question of how to adapt
the definition of majority for an even number of agents: should we accept an issue if and only if
more than half of the agents accept it individually (strict majority), or if at least half of the agents
accept it (weak majority)? Either way, if we want to keep the rule resolute we generate an outcome
biased towards acceptance or rejection in all profiles where an issue is accepted by exactly half of
the agents.
The majority rule being a quota rule, we could express it inDL-PA with the same program schema
of Proposition 3.3. Nonetheless, we provide below an alternative formulation making use of the
counters introduced in Section 2.2, giving us a program of length polynomial in the number of
agents.
PROPOSITION 3.4
Let I be a set of issues andN a set of agents. Let pro := {q1, . . . , qlog n} and con := {q′1, . . . , q
′
log n}
be disjoint subsets of U. The majority ruleMaj is translated into program:
maj(B) :=
j∈I
(
zero(pro ∪ con);
i∈N
(if pij then incr(pro) else incr(con)) ; if pro>con do +pj
)
.
Since majority is a uniform quota rule, program maj economizes on the number of counters for
the quotas. Moreover, it is useful to define it as a separate program since it will be extensively used
in the definitions of other aggregation rules.
Note that for the nomination rule, i.e. the uniform quota rule with q = 1, an even more compact
program is simply nomination(B) := j∈I(if
∨
i∈N pij do + pj).
3.3 Maximization and minimization rules
Rules returning a ballot that appears in the input profile, such as Dictatorshipi, guarantee the outcome
to satisfy the integrity constraint, while more appealing rules such as majority may fail to do so (as
illustrated by Example 2.1). In this section we present two aggregation rules based on maximization
and minimization operations that aim at amending the outcomes of the majority rule when they do
not satisfy the constraint.
3.3.1 Maximal subagenda rule The maximal subagenda rule returns all ballots satisfying the 
integrity constraint and having maximal set-inclusion agreement with the majority outcome [30]:
MSAIC(B) =
⊆
argmax
B|HIC
{
j ∈ I | bj = Maj(B)j
}
.
Differently from simple rules, it is not as straightforward to translate MSAIC into DL-PA. In fact,
we have to encode a maximization operation and we thus need some further notation. Consider the
following programs:
store(P) :=
p∈P
p′ ←[ p
restore1(P) :=
⋃
p∈P
( p ⊕ p′? ; p ←[ p′)
restore≥0(P) :=
p∈P
(skip ∪ p ←[ p′).
The program store stores the truth value of the variables in P in some fresh variables p′, program
restore1(P) restores the truth value of just one variable p that has been previously modified and
program restore≥0(P) restores the truth value of none, some or all variables.
Inspired by analogous work in the literature on belief change for the Possible Models Approach
[26], we now present and prove the correctness of a program translating Msa : IC. Given that we
are dealing with an irresolute rule, we might need to handle multiple outcomes for the same profile,
whence the structure of the proof differs from that of Proposition 3.2. We present it here as an
example for all irresolute aggregation rules.
PROPOSITION 3.5
Let I be a set of issues, N a set of agents and IC a propositional formula. The MSAIC rule is
translated into the following DL-PA program:
msaIC(B) := maj(B) ; store(O) ;flip
≥0(O) ; IC? ;
[
restore1(O) ; restore≥0(O)
]
¬IC?.
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary profile B for a set of agents N and a set of issues I, and let vB be the
valuation translating it according to Definition 2.3. Given that MSAIC is an irresolute rule, we will
show that there exists a bijection g : MSA IC(B)→ V
msa IC
vB such that bj = 1 if and only if pj ∈ g(B)
for all j ∈ I . For B ∈ MSAIC(B) define v ′ = g(B) as follows: v ′ = vB on all variables in P \O, and
pj ∈ v
′ if and only if bj = 1 for pj ∈ O.
We begin by showing that g(B) = v ′ ∈ VmsaICvB for all B ∈ MSAIC(B), proving that the co-domain
of g is VmsaICvB . More precisely, we need to show that there are valuations va, . . . , vf such that va = vB,
vf = v
′ and
(va, vb) ∈‖maj(B)‖, (vb, vc) ∈‖store(O)‖, (vc, vd) ∈‖flip
≥0(O)‖,
(vd , ve) ∈‖ IC?‖, (ve, vf ) ∈‖ [restore
1(O) ; restore≥0(O)]¬IC?‖ .
Recall that programmaj is deterministic: hence, we let vb be the unique valuation reachable from
va after its execution. Program store(O) is deterministic as well, hence let vc be the unique valuation
reachable from vb after its execution. We now have to consider two cases: either (a) Maj(B) |H IC or
(b) Maj(B) 6|H IC.
(a) Since B = Maj(B), we consider the execution of program flip≥0(O) such that no vari-
able gets its truth value flipped (i.e. vd = vc). By Proposition 3.4 we know that pj ∈
vb if and only ifMaj(B)j = 1, for all j ∈ I. Hence, since by assumption Maj(B) |H IC,
we have that vc ∈ ‖ IC ‖. Then, take ve = vd = vf . It is now easily seen that, since the 
variables in O and the fresh ones used by program store(O) have identical truth value, program 
restore1(O) fails at vf , and therefore [restore1(O) ; restore≥0(O)]¬IC holds vacuously in vf . 
Since v ′ = vf = vc, and vc differs from vb only in the assignment to the fresh variables, and 
pj ∈ vb if and only if Maj(B)j = 1 for all j ∈ I , and B = Maj(B), we provided a valuation 
v ′ ∈ VvB
msaIC such that pj ∈ v ′ if and only if bj = 1, for all j ∈ I .
Since B ∈ MSAIC(B), by the definition of MSAIC we know that B |H IC and that there is a 
maximal (with respect to set inclusion) subset Q of issues in Maj(B) such that bj = Maj(B)j. 
Let now S = {pi ∈ O | i 6∈ Q}: we take vd to be the valuation that differs from vc only 
in that the truth values of all the variables in S have been flipped. It is immediately seen that 
(vc, vd) ∈ ‖ flip
≥0(O) ‖. By our choice of valuation based on the features of B ∈ MSAIC(B) 
we have that ve = vd satisfies IC. By a similar reasoning, we can see that by taking vf = ve we 
get (ve, vf ) ∈ ‖ [restore1(O) ; restore≥0(O)]¬IC?‖.
In both cases, we have shown that pj ∈ v ′ if and only if bj = 1 for all j ∈ I.
Let now g : MSAMSA(B) → V
msaIC
vB be the function associating to each B ∈ MSAIC(B) the
valuation v ′ ∈ VmsaICvB constructed above. Simple but tedious arguments can be used to show that g
is a bijection and thus conclude the proof. ¤
For a concrete example of an instance of programmsaIC see Appendix A.
3.3.2 Minimal number of atomic changes rule We have seen in Section 2.1 that the Hamming
distance H(B,B ′) between two ballots is the number of issues on which they differ. The minimal
number of atomic changes rule returns the ballots satisfying the constraint that result from computing
majority on a profile that is minimally distant (in terms of the Hamming distance) from the current
profile. The formal definition is the following:
MNACIC(B) = {B | there is B
∗ such that Maj(B∗) = B,B |H IC,
and for all B′ :
∑
i∈N
H(Bi,B
∗
i ) ≤
∑
i∈N
H(Bi,B
′
i)}.
This rule is also known in the literature as Fulld , for d the Hamming distance [36]. We find the
translation of MNACIC into DL-PA in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.6
Let I be a set of m issues, N a set of n agents and IC a propositional formula. The MNACIC rule is
translated into the following DL-PA program:
mnacIC(B) :=
⋃
0≤d≤m·n
(
H(〈profIC(B,O) ;maj(B)〉IC,B,≥d)? ;flip
1(B)d
)
;
profIC(B,O) ;maj(B) ; IC?.
Program mnacIC finds the minimal number d of variables in the set B whose truth values can be
flipped such that applying program maj to this new profile leads to a valuation where the outcome
satisfies the constraint.
3.4 Preference aggregation rules
This section presents rules that have been adapted in judgment aggregation from the literature
on preference aggregation [4]. The first is the Kemeny rule [28], which is also sometimes called
the distance based rule [17] or Prototyped [36]. We then present the Slater rule—called maxcard 
subagenda rule by [30] and Endpointd by [36]. In both cases, d is the Hamming distance. Finally, 
we discuss the ranked pairs rule, which also comes under the name of the ranked agenda rule [30].
Similarly to the rules presented in the previous section, translations are not straightforward since 
we need to encode minimization operations for the Hamming distance and comparisons with the 
outcome of majority. Since the proofs of correctness of our translations would be in line with that of 
Proposition 3.5, they are omitted.
3.4.1 Kemeny rule The adaptation of the Kemeny rule to judgment aggregation is a procedure that 
returns all ballots that satisfy the constraint and that minimize the sum of the Hamming distance to 
the individual ballots in the profile. The formal definition is as follows:
KemenyIC(B) = argmin
B|HIC
∑
i∈N
H(B,Bi).
We first introduce a program that computes the sum of the Hamming distances between the outcome
and the profile. Then, the counter dis stores this number.
sH(O,B) := zero(dis) ;
i∈N j∈I
(
if pj ⊕ pij do incr(dis)
)
We make use of the program sH for translating the KemenyIC rule in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3.7
Let I be a set of issues, N a set of agents and IC a propositional formula. The KemenyIC rule is
translated into the following DL-PA program:
kemenyIC(B) := flip
≥0(O) ; IC? ; sH(O,B) ; store(dis) ;(
¬〈flip≥0(O) ; IC? ; sH(O,B)〉(dis < dis′)
)
?
Let us give an intuitive breakdown of the program kemenyIC. Subprogram flip
≥0(O) is used to
reach an outcome, by nondeterministically choosing the ‘right’ one. Then, the test IC? checks that
the constraint is satisfied, the program sH(O,B) adds up the Hamming distances to the individual
ballots and the last line of kemenyIC checks that it is not possible to find another outcome that
satisfies the constraint and that is even closer to the individual ballots.
3.4.2 Slater rule In case the outcome of majority does not satisfy the constraint, the Slater rule
outputs those ballots that do satisfy the constraint and that are minimally distant, with respect to the
Hamming distance, from the outcome of majority:
SlaterIC(B) = argmin
B|HIC
H(B,Maj(B)).
PROPOSITION 3.8
Let I be a set of m issues, N a set of agents and IC a propositional formula. The SlaterIC rule is
translated into the following DL-PA program:
slaterIC(B) := maj(B) ;
⋃
0≤d≤m
(
H(IC,O,≥d)? ;flip1(O)d
)
; IC?.
The program slaterIC first computes the majority rule, and then it finds the minimal distance d 
such that by reversing the truth value of d variables in the outcome we reach a valuation where the 
constraint is satisfied. Observe that d = 0 if the majority outcome already satisfies the constraint.
3.4.3 Ranked pairs rule We follow the presentation of the ranked pairs rule given by [17]. The 
majority strength of issue j in profile B is defined as MSB( j) = max{|NBj:0|, |N
B
j:1|} and issues can be
ordered according to their majority strength with ≻Bτ , where τ : I → I is a permutation that breaks
the ties in case two issues have the same majority strength.
For ballot B and partial function ℓ : I → {0, 1}, we write ℓ ⊆ B if ℓ( j) = bj for every j in the
domain of ℓ. Given profile B, integrity constraint IC and permutation τ : I → I, we define the total
function ℓBτ ,IC as follows:
for j ∈ I, following order ≻Bτ do
ℓBτ ,IC( j) :=
{
Maj(B)j if there exists B |H IC such that ℓBτ ,IC ⊆ B
1−Maj(B)j otherwise
The ranked pairs rule returns ballots obtained by the above procedure, for a given tie-breaking
rule and integrity constraint IC:
RPIC(B) :=
{
ℓBτ ,IC
∣∣τ is a permutation on I} .
EXAMPLE 3.9
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and I = {1, 2, 3, 4} with IC := ( p1 ↔ p2) ∨ ( p3 ↔ p4). Consider the profile B
displayed in the following table:
1 2 3 4
Agent 1 1 1 1 0
Agent 2 1 0 1 1
Agent 3 1 0 0 0
Majority 1 0 1 0
We have that MSB(1) = 3, MSB(2) = 2, MSB(3) = 2 and MSB(4) = 2 are the majority strengths
of the issues. Suppose that the tie-breaking function is the following: τ(1) = 4, τ(2) = 3, τ(3) = 2
and τ(4) = 1. We thus have that 1 ≻Bτ 4 ≻
B
τ 3 ≻
B
τ 2 is the ordering of the issues according to their
majority strength in B and the tie-breaking function. Since ℓB
τ ,IC(1) = 1, ℓ
B
τ ,IC(4) = 0, ℓ
B
τ ,IC(3) = 1
and ℓB
τ ,IC(2) = 1, we have RPIC(B) = (1110) for this choice of τ .
The DL-PA program we present as a translation of the RPIC rule is for the special case of no ties in
the majority strengths of the issues. The general case can be dealt with by introducing a sub-program
ordering the issues according to the tie-breaking rule.
First, we define a program that calculates the majority strength of the issues, assuming the majority 
outcome has already been computed:
majSt(B) :=
j∈I
(
zero(msj) ; if pj then
(
i∈N
if pij do incr(msj)
)
else
(
i∈N
if ¬pij do incr(msj)
))
.
The m sets defined below allow us to add and consider one issue at a time in the order of their
majority strengths:
Q1 := {p j | |MS
B
j | ≥ |MS
B
l | for all l ∈ I}
Qk := Qk−1 ∪ {p j | pj 6∈ Qk−1 and for all l ∈ I such that pl 6∈ Qk−1, |MS
B
j | ≥ |MS
B
l |}.
PROPOSITION 3.10
Let I be a set of m issues, N a set of n agents and IC a propositional formula. The RPIC rule is
translated into the following DL-PA program:
rpIC(B) := maj(B) ; if ¬IC do

majSt(B);
1≤i≤m

⋃
j∈I
(∧
l∈I
msj ≥ msl?;
if ¬〈flip≥0(O \ Qi)〉IC do pj ←[ ¬pj ; zero(msj)





 .
The program rpIC computes the majority, and if the constraint is not satisfied it calculates the
majority strength of the issues. Then, this procedure is applied m times: first, the issue j with highest
majority strength at that stage is selected. The program checks whether there is a way to modify the
outcome (without changing the truth value of pj and that of the issues already inspected at some
previous step) to satisfy the constraint. If not, the truth value of pj is flipped—and the value of its
majority strength is set to zero. At the following step, the nondeterministic choice operator selects
the next issue in the ranking; this is possible because the issue has now highest majority strength,
since the one of j has been set to zero.
3.5 Summary and discussion
We provided a DL-PA translation for many known aggregation rules, starting from simple examples
such as dictatorship and quota rules, and then moving to more complex ones based on minimization,
maximization and preference aggregation rules. Observe that the latter type of rules can be easily
adapted to those selecting the most representative voter in a given profile, according to different
principles [17]. Programs in DL-PA translating most representative voter rules are derivable from
those of Kemeny, Slater and ranked pairs by substituting every occurrence of the formula IC by the
formula Repr :=
∨
i∈N
(∧
j∈I pij ↔ pj
)
.
Beyond the theoretical interest of exploring the power of DL-PA, the intended application for such
a translation is to the winner determination problem for judgment aggregation rules [see, e.g. 18, 30].
By model checking DL-PA specifications we can compute the outcome of a rule on a given profile.
For a resolute aggregation rule F, the problem is usually formulated as checking for each issue
j whether F(B)j = 1 for profile B, and this translates in DL-PA into simply checking whether 
vB |H [f(B)] pj holds.
4 Formalization of axiomatic properties
Aggregation rules are usually studied and characterized according to which desirable properties, 
or axioms, they satisfy [11, 23, 31, 35]. Following a similar distinction in preference aggregation 
between intra-profile and inter-profile conditions [42], we separate single-profile and multi-profile 
axioms. While the former relate a profile with the outcome of a rule applied on that profile, the latter 
link two profiles with the outcomes of the same aggregation rule applied on them. The former are 
translated into propositional logic, while the latter are translated into DL-PA.
4.1 Single-profile axioms
For the four single-profile axioms that we present, the full DL-PA machinery is not necessary since 
we can provide an easy and direct translation into propositional logic. We first introduce the definition 
in judgment aggregation, and then proceed to translate them. In Theorem 4.1 we will use the dynamic 
component of DL-PA to prove the correctness of our translations.
A rule F is unanimous if in case all agents agree on some issue j, the outcome of F for issue j 
agrees with them. Formally,
U : for all B, for all j ∈ I and for x ∈ {0, 1}, if for all i ∈ N bij = x then F(B)j = x.
A rule is neutral with respect to the issues if, when two issues are treated in the same way in the 
input, they are treated in the same way in the output.
NI : for all B and any two j, k ∈ I , if for all i ∈ N bij = bik then F(B)j = F(B)k .
A rule is neutral with respect to the domain if, whenever two issues are treated in an opposite way
in the input, their output is opposite.
ND : for all B and any j, k ∈ I, if for all i ∈ N bij = 1− bik then F(B)j = 1− F(B)k .
A rule is neutral-monotonic4 if the acceptance of an issue j in a given profile implies the
acceptance of any other issue k which is accepted by a strict superset of individuals.
MN : for all B and any j, k ∈ I , if for all i ∈ N bij = 1 implies bik = 1, and there is s ∈ N
such that bsj = 0 and bsk = 1, then F(B)j = 1 implies F(B)k = 1.
We are now ready to prove the following result:
THEOREM 4.1
Let B be a set of variables for agents inN and issues in I , let F be an aggregator for n and m and let
f be its DL-PA translation. Moreover, let
U :=
∧
j∈I
((( ∧
i∈N
pij
)
→ pj
)
∧
(( ∧
i∈N
¬pij
)
→ ¬pj
))
,
4This axiom is non-standard and has been introduced by [18].
NI :=
∧
j∈I
∧
k∈I
(( ∧
i∈N
( pij ↔ pik)
)
→ ( pj ↔ pk)
)
,
ND :=
∧
j∈I
∧
k∈I
(( ∧
i∈N
( pij ↔ ¬pik)
)
→ ( pj ↔ ¬pk)
)
,
MN :=
∧
j∈I
∧
k∈I
(( ∧
i∈N
( pij → pik) ∧
∨
s∈N
(¬psj ∧ psk)
)
→ ( pj → pk)
)
.
Then, the following equivalences hold:
(i) F satisfies U if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]U.
(ii) F satisfies NI if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]N
I .
(iii) F satisfies ND if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]N
D.
(iv) F satisfiesMN if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]M
N.
PROOF. We provide a proof for (i), since the remaining parts can be proven in an analogous way.
For the left-to-right direction, consider an arbitrary valuation v such that v |H ProfIC(B,O) and
suppose for reductio that there is some v ′ such that (v, v ′) ∈‖ f(B) ‖ but v ′ 6∈ ‖ U ‖. Given the
definition of the interpretation, this means that there is some j ∈ I such that v ′ 6∈ ‖ ((
∧
i∈N pij) →
pj) ∧ ((
∧
i∈N ¬pij) → ¬pj) ‖. Assume, without loss of generality, that v
′ 6∈ ‖ (
∧
i∈N pij) → pj) ‖.
Hence, we have that v′ ∈‖
∧
i∈N pij ‖ and v
′ 6∈ ‖pj ‖. Since v |H ProfIC(B,O) and (v, v ′) ∈‖ f(B)‖,
we have that v corresponds to some profile B and v ′ corresponds to F(B).
By assumption, F satisfies U: in particular, this means that for all j ∈ I , if for all i ∈ N we have
bij = 1, then F(B)j = 1. Observe that by the DL-PA programs we provided to translate aggregation
rules, v and v ′ do not differ on the variables in B. Hence, the fact that v ′ ∈‖
∧
i∈N pij ‖ implies that
v ∈‖
∧
i∈N pij ‖. Therefore, in profile Bwe have bij = 1 for all i ∈ N , which implies that F(B)j = 1.
This contradicts the fact that v ′ corresponds to F(B) and that v ′ 6∈ ‖pj ‖. Hence, v ′ ∈‖U‖.
For the right-to-left direction, take an arbitrary profile B. Suppose, for reductio, that for some
j ∈ I in profile B, we have bij = 1 for all i ∈ N and F(B)j = 0. Consider now valuations v and v ′
corresponding to B and F(B), respectively. This means that v |H ProfIC(B,O), that (v, v ′) ∈‖f(B)‖
and that v′ ∈‖U ‖. Since v and v′ do not differ on the variables in B, by spelling out the definition
of the interpretation we get that v′ ∈‖pj ‖. This contradicts the fact that v′ corresponds to F(B) and
that F(B)j = 0. Therefore, we have that F(B) = 1. ¤
4.2 Multi-profile axioms
The three multi-profile axioms we present are translated asDL-PA formulas. In fact, to check whether
an aggregation rule satisfies these axioms, we need to compare the outcomes of the rule on different
profiles. Dealing with multiple profiles means referring to more than one valuation (and applying
the program expressing rule F more than once), whence the need for DL-PA.
A rule is independent if, whenever an issue j has the same acceptance–rejection pattern in two
profiles, the outcome of the rule is identical for j in both of them. Formally,
I : for any j ∈ I and profiles B and B′, if for all i ∈ N bij = b′ij then F(B)j = F(B
′)j.
A rule F is independent-monotonic if, whenever we consider two profiles such that the second 
differs from the first in that some agent i first rejected issue j and then she accepts it, if j was accepted 
in the first outcome then it should still be accepted in the second. Let (B−i, B′i) = (B1, . . . , B
′
i, . . . , Bn) 
for some profile B:
MI : for any issue j ∈ I , agent i ∈ N , profiles B = (B1, . . . ,Bn) and B′ = (B−i,B′i),
if bij = 0 and b′ij = 1 then F(B)j = 1 implies F(B
′)j = 1.
An anonymous rule treats each agent in the same way. That is, by permuting the order of the
individual ballots in the input, the output for all issues does not change.
A : for all B and any permutation σ : N → N , F(B1, . . . ,Bn) = F(Bσ(1), . . . ,Bσ(n)).
We are now ready to prove the following:
THEOREM 4.2
Let B be the set of variables for agents in N and issues in I , let F be an aggregation rule for n and
m and let f be its DL-PA translation. Moreover, for Bj := {p ij | i ∈ N } let
I :=
∧
j∈I
((
pj →
[
flip≥0(B \ Bj) ;profIC(B,O) ; f(B)
]
pj
)
∧
(
¬pj →
[
flip≥0(B \ Bj) ;profIC(B,O) ; f(B)
]
¬pj
))
,
MI :=
∧
j∈I
(
pj →
∧
i∈N
[+pij ;profIC(B,O) ; f(B)]pj
)
,
A :=

store(O) ;

 ⋃
i,k∈N
∪
j∈I
(
if pij ⊕ pkj do (flip
1({p ij}) ;flip
1({p kj}))
)
n−1
;
zero(O) ; f(B)

∧
j∈I
( pj ↔ p
′
j).
Then, the following is the case:
(i) F satisfies I if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]I.
(ii) F satisfies M I if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]M
I.
(iii) F satisfies A if and only if |H ProfIC(B,O)→ [f(B)]A.
PROOF. The proof for (i) and (ii) being very similar, we just give a proof for (ii). For the left-to-
right direction, consider v1 such that v1 |H ProfIC(B,O) and suppose for reductio that there is some
valuation v2 such that (v1, v2) ∈‖ f(B) ‖ but for some issue k ∈ I we have (a) v2 ∈‖ pk ‖, and
(b) v2 6∈ ‖
∧
i∈N [+pik ;profIC(B,O) ; f(B)]pk ‖. The latter implies that there is some agent s ∈ N
such that (c) there is v3 where (v2, v3) ∈‖+psk ;profIC(B,O) ; f(B)‖, and (d) v3 6∈‖pk ‖. Given that
(v2, v3) ∈‖+psk ;profIC(B,O); f(B) ‖, then there is some valuation va such that (v2, va) ∈‖+psk ‖
and (va, v3) ∈‖ profIC(B,O) ; f(B) ‖. Hence, va corresponds to a profile B
a and v3 corresponds
to F(Ba).
Consider now valuations v1, v2 and va. While v1 and v2 do not differ on the variables in B, v2 and 
va possibly differ on psk . We now focus on the interesting case: namely, the one where they do differ. 
If they differ, we have that psk 6∈ v1 and psk 6∈ v2 but psk ∈ va. Note that since v1 |H ProfIC(B, O) 
and (v1, v2) ∈ ‖ f(B) ‖, this means that v1 corresponds to a profile B1 and v2 corresponds to F(B1).
Since b1sk = 0 and by (b) we have F(B
1)j = 1, and since by assumption F satisfies MI, and since Ba
differs from B1 only on bsk , because b
a
sk = 1, we must have that F(B
a)k = 1. But this contradicts
the fact that by (d) we have pk 6∈ v3.
For the right-to-left direction, consider an arbitrary profile B. Suppose, for reductio, that there is
some issue j ∈ I, some agent i ∈ N and profile B′, such that we have bij = 0, b′ij = 1, F(B)j = 0 and
F(B′)j = 0. Consider now valuation v1 corresponding to profile B and valuation v2 corresponding to
F(B). Moreover, consider valuation va corresponding to profile B′ and valuation vb corresponding to
F(B′). Since by assumption F satisfies MI, and pj ∈ v2, and va only differs from v1 in that pij ∈ va,
we see that from the axiom we should get pj ∈ vb. This contradicts the fact that vb is a translation of
F(B′) and that F(B′)j = 0.
To obtain a proof for (iii), recall that it is possible to generate all the n! permutations of n agents
by repeatedly swapping the positions of just two agents with at most n−1 swaps [46]. Note also that
the translation of the Anonymity axiom first stores the result of the aggregation rule in some fresh
variables p′j, then for n−1 times it nondeterministically selects two agents and swaps their individual
ballots by inverting the truth values of the corresponding variables. Finally, it executes again the rule
F and it checks that the two results coincide.
¤
4.3 Summary and discussion
We have translated judgment aggregation axioms into formulas of either propositional logic or DL-
PA. More precisely, we have used propositional logic for single-profile axioms, andDL-PA for multi-
profile axioms, since these are the most suited formalisms for the corresponding cases, as explained
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The possible applications of such a translation of axioms for aggregation rules are twofold. On the
one hand, a negative answer on the model checking for formula [f(B)]axiom tells us that rule F does
not satisfy the axiom whose DL-PA translation is axiom. On the other hand, while we cannot take a
positive answer to this model checking as a definite answer that the aggregation rule (considered for
all n and m) does satisfy an axiom, we can still use such a piece of information to gather confidence
that the rule indeed satisfies the axiom.
5 Safety of the agenda
A recurring problem in judgment aggregation is that the outcome of an aggregation process might
not satisfy the integrity constraint even though each agent satisfies it in the submitted ballot. One
way out of this problem is to investigate whether we can ensure that the outcome of certain groups of
aggregation rules will always satisfy a given constraint, provided it has a particular syntactical form.
This approach is known in the judgment aggregation literature under the name of safety of the agenda
[18]. In this section we express known agenda properties within the logical formalism of our choice,
something that has never been explored in the literature connecting judgment aggregation to logic.
5.1 Safety and prime implicants
We begin by introducing prime implicants to express basic concepts of the agenda safety problem.
For a start, let a literal be either a variable p or its negation ¬p. A term D is a conjunction of distinct
literals, and D − D′ returns all the literals of D that are not in D′. A term D is an implicant of ϕ if
and only if D |H ϕ. We present now the formal definition of prime implicants as given by [33]:
DEFINITION 5.1
D is a prime implicant of ϕ if and only if (i) D is an implicant of ϕ, and (ii) for all literals L in D,
(D − {L}) 6|H ϕ.
Every formula ϕ can be rewritten as a conjunction of negations of the prime implicants of ¬ϕ
[34]. Since in particular this holds for IC, we assume in the following that integrity constraints are
written in this syntactical form.
We now reinterpret some known agenda properties of formula-based judgment aggregation for
integrity constraints, making use of the concept of prime implicants. Let Pϕ be the set of variables
occurring in ϕ.
DEFINITION 5.2
A constraint IC has the k-median property (kMP) if and only if any prime implicant D of ¬ IC is
such that |PD| ≤ k. A constraint IC has the simplified median property (SMP) if and only if any
prime implicant D of ¬ IC is such that |PD| = 2 and for p, q ∈ PD we have that ¬Lp ∧¬Lq is also a
prime implicant of ¬IC.
For k = 2 we speak of the median property (MP). Observe that if IC = ⊤ we do not have
any prime implicant of ¬IC, which means that the issues are all independent from one another—a
condition known as syntactic simplified median property in the literature.
We conclude this section by providing the definition of safety for integrity constraints. Given a set
of axioms AX, we call the set FIC[AX] := {F | F satisfies all axioms in AX and the domain of F
is Mod(IC)N for some N } a class of aggregation procedures. Then:
DEFINITION 5.3
An integrity constraint IC is safe for the class FIC[AX] if and only if for all F ∈ FIC[AX], we have
F(B) |H IC for all inputs B ∈ Mod(IC)N .
The intuitive meaning is that when an integrity constraint is safe for a group of aggregation rules
that all satisfy some axioms, on every input profile the output will satisfy the constraint.
5.2 Agenda safety in DL-PA
Our first result is a Lemma which characterizes by a DL-PA formula the valuations where some
prime implicant of a formula ϕ is true.
LEMMA 5.4
Let D be a term such that PD ⊆ Pϕ . Then, D is a prime implicant of ϕ if and only if D |H PI(PD,ϕ),
where PI(PD,ϕ) := [flip
≥0(Pϕ \ PD)]ϕ ∧ [flip
1(PD)]¬[flip
≥0(Pϕ \ PD)]ϕ.
PROOF. For the left-to-right direction, let D be a prime implicant of ϕ and suppose, for reductio,
that there is some valuation making D true such that ¬PI(PD,ϕ) holds. Observe that if we have
〈flip≥0(Pϕ \PD)〉¬ϕ we would have a contradiction with condition (i) of Definition 5.1 (D is not an
implicant of ϕ). In fact, while the literals in D are true at the current valuation ¬ϕ holds. On the other 
hand, if 〈flip1(PD)〉[flip
≥0(Pϕ \ PD)]ϕ is the case, we would have a contradiction with condition (ii) 
of Definition 5.1 (D is not prime). In fact, some variable pk ∈ PD corresponding to a literal Lk in D 
would make (D − {Lk}) |H ϕ hold. Therefore, we have D |H PI(PD, ϕ).
We prove the right-to-left direction by contraposition. Suppose D is not a prime implicant of ϕ. By 
Definition 5.1 this means that either D is not an implicant of ϕ, which would imply that there is some 
valuation where D and 〈flip≥0(Pϕ \ PD)〉¬ϕ hold; or that D is not prime, which would imply that 
in some valuation D holds and also 〈flip1(PD)〉[flip
≥0(Pϕ \ PD)]ϕ. Thus, in both cases we conclude 
that there is a valuation where D holds and yet PI(PD, ϕ) does not. ¤
Lemma 5.4 allows us to characterize the kMP in the following proposition. A similar result on the 
SMP follows immediately.
PROPOSITION 5.5
Constraint IC has the kMP if and only if |H ¬IC →
∨
P⊆PIC
|P|≤k
PI(P,¬IC).
PROOF. For the left-to-right direction, assume that IC has the kMP and suppose, for reductio, that
there is some v such that v |H ¬IC and v |H
∧
P⊆PIC
|P|≤k
¬PI(P,¬IC). Since v 6|H IC and IC is written
as a conjunction of negations of prime implicants of ¬IC, we know that there must be some prime
implicant D of ¬IC such that v |H D and that |PD| ≤ k. By Lemma 5.4 we thus get that v |H
PI(PD,¬IC), which contradicts v |H
∧
P⊆PIC
|P|≤k
¬PI(P,¬IC).
We prove the right-to-left direction by contraposition. Suppose IC does not have the kMP: hence,
there is some prime implicant D of ¬IC such that |PD| ≥ k + 1. We now provide a valuation
v such that v |H ¬IC and v 6|H
∨
P⊆PIC
|P|≤k
PI(P,¬IC). Consider valuation v such that v |H D and
for all other prime implicants D′ of ¬IC, we have v 6|H D′ (such a valuation always exists). Since
v |H D, we get by Definition 5.1 that v |H ¬IC. Suppose there was some other term D′ such that
v |H PI(PD′ ,¬IC), |D
′| ≤ k and v |H D′: by Lemma 5.4 this would imply that D′ is a prime implicant
of ¬IC, contradicting our choice of valuation.
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PROPOSITION 5.6
Constraint IC has the SMP if and only if
|H ¬IC→
∨
pi,pk∈PIC
(
PI({p i, pk},¬IC ) ∧ [flip
1( p i);flip
1( p k)]PI({p i, pk},¬IC )
)
.
PROOF. For the left-to-right direction, assume that IC has the SMP and consider an arbitrary valuation
vwhere v |H ¬IC. For reductio, suppose the consequent does not hold. Hence, either there is no prime
implicant of ¬IC of size 2 or there is one, but the negation of its literals is not a prime implicant of
¬IC. Either way, this contradicts the assumption that IC has the SMP.
For the other direction, assume that IC does not have the SMP. This means that either it has not the
MP or it has the MP but there is a prime implicant of ¬IC such that its negated literals are not also
a prime implicant of ¬IC. In the first case, we would get by Proposition 5.5 that there is a valuation
v such that v 6|H PI( pi, pk},¬IC), thus falsifying the consequent. In the second case, we would
have v 6|H [flip1( pi);flip
1( pk)]PI({pi, pk},¬IC), thus falsifying the consequent again. Therefore,
6|H
∨
pi,pk∈PIC
(
PI({pi, pk},¬IC) ∧ [flip
1( pi);flip
1( pk)]PI({pi, pk},¬IC)
)
. ¤
Observe that in the consequent of the formula characterizing the kMP we have a disjunction over 
all subsets of size k of variables of the constraint. This implies that the formula has length exponential 
in the size of the constraint. While this appears as a negative result it is in line with the literature, 
since the computational problem of deciding whether a constraint satisfies one of the previous agenda 
properties is at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.5
6 Discussion and related work
In this section we compare our work with the literature on formalizations of judgment aggregation 
and social choice theory in logical languages. We discuss whether and how aggregation rules, 
axioms and the agenda safety problem have been treated by other researchers. We then discuss the 
significance of our results in the formalization of characterization and impossibility theorems from 
social choice, and we discuss potential applications of automated reasoning techniques.
6.1 Related work on logic and judgment aggregation
In this paper we thoroughly explored the possibility to translate judgment aggregation into DL-PA, 
providing both general and specific results for a number of aggregation rules, axioms and safety 
of the agenda properties. A translation of the issue-wise majority rule has been proposed by [1] 
for Judgment Aggregation Logic, with the goal to express a variant of the discursive dilemma. The 
formula they use, however, is of exponential size in the number of agents, since they explicitly list 
all possible majoritarian coalitions in the profile (i.e. sets of agents whose size is more than half the 
total number of agents). Our formalization in Section 3.2.2 is more compact thanks to the use of 
counters.
The approach taken by [38] to study aggregation rules in formula-based judgment aggregation is 
quite different from ours. The author focuses on three rules: the majority rule, the consensus rule (i.e. 
a rule that accepts a formula if and only if all agents accept it) and the dictatorship of agent i. Given 
an agenda and a group of agents, the author defines sets of collective judgment sets corresponding 
to the outcome of a specific aggregation rule (among the ones mentioned before) and he provides an 
axiomatization for these outcome sets. Pauly’s approach is nonstandard since, as we shall see in the 
following section, when characterizing an aggregation rule we do not usually refer to the structure 
of the set of its possible outcomes, but on the properties satisfied by the rule on every input.
As far as axioms are concerned, logical expressions for a small number of them can be found in 
Judgment Aggregation Logic [1]. Given that the goal of the authors is to express the Condorcet’s 
voting paradox as a formula of the logic, they only focus on positive unanimity, independence and 
non-dictatorship (i.e. an axiom satisfied by all rules that are not a dictatorship of some agent i). 
Moreover, a translation of the preference aggregation axioms for strong monotonicity, independence 
of irrelevant alternatives and dictatorship is expressed in the Logic for Social Choice Functions 
by [9].
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that extensively addresses the problem of the safety 
of the agenda is that of [40]. However, the aim of the author’s investigations there is to study whether 
the safety results we presented in Section 5 continue to hold if the underlying logic of the agenda is 
non-classical.
5See the5
p
2-completeness results by [18].
6.2 Quantifying over aggregation rules
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, one of the goals of formalizing a given setting in 
computational social choice is to represent known impossibility or characterization results, such 
as Arrow’s Theorem. In judgment aggregation, a result that is analogous to that of Arrow for its 
importance in the field is the characterization of the majority rule given by [35].
While originally formulated for preference aggregation, this result can be rephrased in binary 
aggregation as stating that, for an odd number of agents and one issue, an aggregator satisfies ND, 
MI and A if and only if it is the majority rule. Recalling the conclusions of Section 4, we see that 
the right-to-left direction of the theorem is easily expressible in our framework, as it amounts to 
|H ProfIC(Bn,1, O1) → [maj(Bn,1)](A ∧ M
I ∧ ND) for any odd n. On the other hand, for the left-to-
right direction we find a negative answer: in order to express it, we would need to leave unspecified 
the program for the aggregation rule to be written inside the axioms in Theorem 4.2, which would 
then turn out to be equivalent to the program for majority, something that it is not possible to achieve 
in DL-PA.
Nevertheless, we can express existing results for the safety of the agenda problem. As an example, 
the known theorem stating that a constraint is safe for the majority rule if and only if the constraint
has the MP, originally proved by [11], can be stated as |H [profIC(B, O) ; maj(B)]IC ↔ MPIC for an 
odd number of individuals.
6.3 Automated reasoning
An essential feature of DL-PA is that this modal logic is grounded on propositional logic, as we have 
seen in Section 2.2. Our work thus gives direct access to SAT-solvers to enhance research in judgment 
aggregation, since we now have a chain of translations from aggregation problems to DL-PA, and 
from DL-PA to propositional logic. Therefore, we can get the best of both formalisms: DL-PA gives 
us an elegant and compact way to represent the key features of judgment aggregation, and at the 
same time we do not have to design specific solvers for it since we can deploy the existing ones for 
propositional logic.
Similar concerns about implementation have been addressed with respect to the Logic for Social 
Choice Functions as well [9], though in that case the focus was on preference aggregation rather 
than judgment aggregation. Interestingly, this logic has indeed been implemented by [44] in the 
Common Lisp language, however focusing on game theoretical notions for positional scoring rules 
(e.g. strategy-proofness and the presence of Nash or dominance equilibria in given profiles). While 
the possibility of translating Judgment Aggregation Logic into first-order logic is envisaged by [1] 
in the conclusion of their paper, a possible implementation of the setting is left as an issue for future 
research.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we translated for the first time classical problems in judgment aggregation into an 
existing logical formalism reducible to propositional logic, in line with similar work in the knowledge 
representation literature. The core ideas of our translation from judgment aggregation to DL-PA 
consist in turning profiles of individual ballots into a specific type of valuation, and aggregation 
rules into DL-PA programs modifying the truth values of a set of outcome variables.
Firstly, we investigated the boundaries of expressibility of aggregation rules in DL-PA. Theorem 3.1 
gave us a positive result, in that any aggregator can be translated into DL-PA, albeit with a program of 
length exponential in the number of issues and agents. To circumvent this shortcoming we provided
more compact translations of some well-known aggregation rules. We then oriented our research 
towards single and multi-profile axioms for judgment aggregation rules, translating them as propo-
sitional or DL-PA formulas. Additionally, we studied the safety of the agenda problem by using the 
concept of prime implicants to provide DL-PA equivalents of the most common agenda properties.
Our results showcase the flexibility of DL-PA as a useful formalism for judgment aggregation 
problems, one in which human-readable formulas can be written and later fed to automated solvers 
to obtain the result of an aggregation rule, check the satisfaction of axiomatic properties or verify 
the safety of a given judgment aggregation agenda.
The framework proposed in this paper could be easily generalized to a setting where agents are 
allowed to abstain on the issues [12]. Specifically, it would be sufficient to consider an additional set 
of variables for the profile, to keep track of the issues on which the agents abstained. The definitions 
of the aggregation rules and the axioms would then be easy to adapt. Furthermore, the possibility of 
defining counters and to formalize the concept of the Hamming distance allows the DL-PA formalism 
to incorporate the study of strategic judgment aggregation, opening an interesting direction for future 
work [10].
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A An example of a rule compactly expressed in DL-PA
We here give a concrete example of how the programs we defined in Section 3 shorten the general
program schema given in the proof of Theorem 3.1. More precisely, we spell out below the program
msaIC for 3 agents and 3 issues where IC = (p1 ↔ (p2 ∧ p3)), as in Example 2.1.
msaIC(B
3,3) := maj(B3,3) ; store(O3) ;flip≥0(O3) ; IC? ;[restore1(O3) ; restore≥0(O3)]¬IC?
=
⋃
j∈I
(
zero(pro ∪ con) ;
⋃
i∈N
(if pij then incr(pro) else incr(con)) ; if pro>con do + pj
)
;
store(O3) ;flip≥0(O3) ; IC? ;[restore1(O3) ; restore≥0(O3)]¬IC?
=
(
− q1 ;−q2 ;−q
′
1 ;−q
′
2 ;(( p11? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1)))
∪ (¬p11? ; (¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2? ;+q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;( p21? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;
(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1))) ∪ (¬p21? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1)
∪ (¬q′2? ;+q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;( p31? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ; (¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2?+ q2 ;−q1)))
∪ (¬p31? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2? ;+q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;((((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1)
∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;+p1) ∪ (¬((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1) ∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;⊤?)) ;(
− q1 ;−q2 ;−q
′
1 ;−q
′
2 ;( p12? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1)))
∪ (¬p12? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ; (¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2?+ q
′
2 ;−q
′
1)) ;( p22? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;
(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1))) ∪ (¬p22? ; (¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1)
∪ (¬q′2?+ q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;( p32? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1)))
∪ (¬p32? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2?+ q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ; ((((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1)
∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;+p2) ∪ (¬((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1) ∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;⊤?)) ;(
− q1 ;−q2 ;−q
′
1 ;−q
′
2 ;( p13? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2?+ q2 ;−q1)))
∪ (¬p13? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ; (¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2? ;+q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;( p23? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;
(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2?+ q2 ;−q1))) ∪ (¬p23? ; (¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1)
∪ (¬q′2? ;+q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ;( p33? ;(¬(q1 ∧ q2)? ;(¬q1? ;+q1) ∪ (¬q2? ;+q2 ;−q1))
∪ (¬p33? ;(¬(q
′
1 ∧ q
′
2)? ;(¬q
′
1? ;+q
′
1) ∪ (¬q
′
2?+ q
′
2 ;−q
′
1))) ; ((((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1)
∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;+p3) ∪ (¬((q1 ∧ ¬q
′
1) ∨ (q1 ↔ q
′
1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q
′
2))? ;⊤?)) ;
( p1? ;+p
′
1) ∪ (¬p1? ;−p
′
1) ;( p2? ;+p
′
2) ∪ (¬p2? ;−p
′
2) ;( p3? ;+p
′
3) ∪ (¬p3? ;−p
′
3) ;
((+p1 ∪ −p1) ;(+p2 ∪ −p2) ∪ (+p3 ∪ −p3)) ;( p1 ↔ ( p2 ∧ p3))? ;
[( p1 ⊕ p
′
1? ;( p
′
1? ;+p1) ∪ (¬p
′
1? ;−p1)) ;( p2 ⊕ p
′
2? ;( p
′
2? ;+p2) ∪ (¬p
′
2? ;−p2)) ;
( p3 ⊕ p
′
3? ;( p
′
3? ;+p3) ∪ (¬p
′
3? ;−p3)) ;(⊤? ∪ ( p
′
1? ;+p1) ∪ (¬p
′
1? ;−p1)) ;
(⊤? ∪ ( p′2? ;+p2) ∪ (¬p
′
2? ;−p2)) ;(⊤? ∪ ( p
′
3? ;+p3) ∪ (¬p
′
3? ;−p3))]¬( p1 ↔ ( p2 ∧ p3))?
As shown above, the full specification in DL-PA of themsaIC program, even for a small profile of
3 agents and 3 issues, turns out to be indeed rather long. Nevertheless, observe that the propositional
formula expressing this rule, constructed following the proof of Theorem 3.1, needs to specify the
outcome for all the 23 × 23 × 23 possible profiles, which results in a significantly longer formula.
Received 25 July 2018
